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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STAfE OF UTAH
GILBERT R. WILBURN,
Petitioner/Appellant,

Ccjnirt of A p p e a l s
Ca^e No. 860202-CA

vs.
INTERSTATE ELECTRIC, NATIONAL
UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF
PITTSBURGH, SECOND INJURY FUND
and UTAH STATE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION,

C a t e g o r y No. 6

Respondents.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT GILBERT R. WILBURN

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-83 (1986 Supplement) as a Petition
for Review from an Order of the Industrial Commission denying
appellant's Motion for Review.

In the instant case, a hearing

was held on May 14, 1986, at 10:00 o'clock a.m.
Law Judge Richard G. Sumsion presided.

Administrative

Following the

hearing, on May 28, 1986, Judge Sumsion issued Interim
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order awarding
benefits for permanent and total disability to the applicant.
Respondents Interstate Electric Company (hereinafter
"Interstate Electric") and National Union Fire Insurance
Company of Pittsburgh (hereinafter "National Union")
subsequently filed a Motion for Review pursuant to U.C.A.
§35-1-82.53.

Thereafter, the Administrative Law Judge

issued Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order denying Mr. Wilburn's claim.

Following the issuance of

the Supplemental Order, the appellant filed a Motion for Review
to the Industrial Commission.

Applicant's motion was denied

and the order of the Administrative Law Judge affirmed on
September 9, 1986.

This Appeal followed.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

The issues presented for review are as follows:
1.

Whether a compromise and settlement agreement

bars a worker's right to claim permanent total disability
benefits where the language of the agreement does not purport
to settle claims for permanent and total disability, either
expressly or by implication.
2.

Whether a compromise and settlement agreement

can properly waive an employee's right to compensation despite
Utah Code Annotated §35-1-90, where the issue of
liability was not, in fact, doubtful.

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS

Appellant respectfully contends that U.C.A.
§35-1-90 (1953 as amended) is determinative of the issues
to be decided in this case.

Section 35-1-90 reads as follows:

No agreement by an employee to waive his
rights to compensation under this title
shall be valid. No agreement by an
employee to pay any portion of the premium
2

paid by his employer shall be v^lid. Any
employer who deducts any portioh of such
premium from the wages or salary of any
employee entitled to the benefits of this
title is guilty of a misdemeanour, and shall
be fined not more than $100 for each such
offense. (Emphasis added).
STATEMENT OF THE CASfi

The facts pertinent to this cas^ are as follows:
1.

Appellant Gilbert Wilburn is a 66-year

old man with a ninth grade education who l|as worked as a heavy
duty mechanic all his life.
2.

(R. at 52.)

At all times pertinent hereto, Mr. Wilburn

was employed by respondent Interstate Elecftric as a mechanic,
repairing and overhauling portable power plants, water pumps,
oil pumps and hydraulic and telephone pol^ pullers.
3.

(R. at 53.)

On April 14, 1984, Mr. Vifilburn attempted to

lift a portable power plant weighing between seventy and ninety
pounds from the floor to his work bench.
4.

(R. at 54, 84.)

As he lifted the power ^lant and twisted to

set it on his work bench, Mr. Wilburn felt a severe burning
pain in his low back and abdomen.
5.

(R. at 54, 55.)

The pain was so severe that it took his

breath away forcing him to lean temporarily over the power
plant and his work table in order to regaih his senses. He
then walked to a nearby bench and laid dowh.
6.

(R. at 55, 56.)

Mr. Wilburn promptly reported this incident

to a co-worker, the shop foreman, and the ^hop manager.
56, 57.)
3

(R. at

7.

He continued to work for the remainder of the

day, as well as the two following days thinking the pain would
pass with time.
8.

(R. at 57.)
Finally, on the second day after this lifting

incident, Mr. Wilburn was in such distress that he was forced
to leave work and consult Dr. Gene Smith, an orthopedic
surgeon.

(R. at 58, 59.)
9.

Although he was able to return to work just a

few days after the accident, Mr. Wilburn continued to
experience significant pain in his low back and right side.
(R. at 61.)
10.

On or about February 2, 1981, Mr. Wilburn

was examined by Dr. Wally Hess pursuant to an independent
medical examination requested by defendant National Union.
Following his examination, Dr. Hess assigned Mr. Wilburn a
permanent partial impairment rating of twenty percent (20%),
fifteen percent of which he attributed to preexisting causes
and five percent of which he attributed to aggravation of the
preexisting condition by the industrial episode.
11.

(R. at 180.)

Following the industrial incident at issue,

Mr. Wilburn continued to work for Interstate Electric until
July 31, 1981, when he was laid off.

During this period of

time, however, Mr. Wilburn1s condition continued to
deteriorate.

(R. at 65.)
12.

In August of 1981, Mr. Wilburn began seeing

Dr. Gordon Affleck.

In a letter dated February 10, 1982,

directed to American International Adjustment Company,
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(hereinafter "American International"), D^:. Affleck stated
that in his opinion Mr. Wilburn had at le^st a thirty percent
(30%) permanent partial impairment with twenty percent
attributable to preexisting conditions an<p. ten percent due to
his industrial injury.
13.

(R. at 225.)

On April 7, 1982, Dr. Affleck again wrote

to American International, stating that Mt. Wilburn was
suffering from a permanent disability of between twenty-five to
forty percent.
14.

(R. at 227.)
Following a second independent medical

examination of Mr. Wilburn on June 20, 1983, Dr. Hess
increased his permanent partial disability rating of Mr.
Wilburn!s condition to thirty-six percent (36%) whole man,
stating that fifteen percent of this ratiitg was due to problems
with Mr. Wilburn1s cervical spine, fifteen percent was due to
preexisting problems in his lumbar and luirfcosacral spine, and
ten percent was due to problems related toi the industrial
injury of his lumbosacral spine.
15.

(R. at 188, 189.)

Inasmuch as his condition had materially

worsened, Mr. Wilburn sought additional worker's compensation
benefits.

(R. at 27.)
16.

American International subsequently

instructed Mr. Wilburn to meet with Stuart Poelman, counsel
for respondents Interstate Electric and National Union, on
February 24, 1984.
17.

(R. at 31.)

During the course of Mr. Wilburnfs meeting

with Mr. Poelman, Mr. Poelman claims that he informed Mr.

5

Wilburn of all of the defenses the respondents could raise,
including the defense of no accident, if Mr. Wilburn were to
file a claim for additional benefits. Mr. Poelman also told
Mr. Wilburn that if the matter proceeded to a hearing and the
respondents were to prevail, Mr. Wilburn would lose all
workmen's compensation benefits, including his medical
benefits.

(R. at 110, 111.)
18.

Following their meeting, Mr. Poelman

prepared the Compromise and Settlement Agreement (hereinafter
"Agreement") at issue herein.

Pursuant to its terms, Mr.

Wilburn was paid additional temporary total disability in the
amount of $1,590 for the period of September 20, through
November 22, 1984, plus compensation for an additional five
percent permanent partial disability from both the Employer and
the Second Injury Fund.
19.

(R. at 114, 115.)

Following his meeting with Mr. Poelman, Mr.

Wilburn contacted Shaun Howell, legal counsel for the
Commission regarding the Agreement and his possible claim.

(R.

at 114.)
20.

Ms. Howell discussed with Mr. Wilburn the

various possible outcomes that could occur should he assert a
claim and pursue it to a hearing.

At no time, however, did Ms.

Howell advise Mr. Wilburn whether or not he should sign the
Compromise and Settlement Agreement.
21.

(R. at 138, 140.)

When Mr. Wilburn first approached Ms.

Howell, he was uncertain as to the type of claim he should
assert.

Furthermore, he was extremely concerned about the
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continuation of his compensation because h^ had not been able
to return to work.
22.

(R. at 135.)

Mr. Wilburn testified that by signing the

Agreement, he understood he was compromising his then current
claim for additional temporary total and permanent partial
disability benefits.

He further understood that he would not

be precluded from seeking additional benefits in the future
should his condition warrant them.
23.

(R. at 77, 78.)

Mr. Wilburn!s understanding to this effect

was due in part to the following provision contained in the
Agreement itself:

"The Employer and The Fund agree that The

Fund will reimburse the Employer for two-thirds of all future
medical expense and temporary total disability for which
liability to the Applicant may be incurred."
24.

(R. at 78.)

The Agreement does not mention at any place

permanent and total disability or the effect its acceptance
would purportedly have on Mr. Wilburn's right to assert such
a claim in the future.
25.

(R. at 37-40.)

On November 1, 1985, Drt Affleck increased

Mr. Wilburn1s permanent total disability rating to forty-five
percent (45%) stating that twelve percent is directly
attributable to the industrial incident.
26.

(R. at 250.)

Prior to the industrial incident at issue

herein, Mr. Wilburn had had no problems with his back which
had been serious enough to prevent him frim working.
53, 82-83, 125.)
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(R. at

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Because of the express provision in the Utah
Workman's Compensation Act prohibiting the waiver of
benefits by employees in worker's compensation matters, any
Agreement which purports to compromise the right of a worker
must be strictly construed in order to avoid an unlawful
waiver.

Furthermore, all doubts and ambiguities relative to

the Agreement should be resolved in favor of the employee so
that the beneficent purposes of the Worker's Compensation Act
might be fulfilled.

Where an alleged Compromise and Settlement

Agreement does not specifically bar an employee's right to
assert a future claim, the employee should not thereafter be
precluded from asserting that claim.

A holding to the contrary

constitutes a waiver of the employee's right to compensation to
which he is otherwise entitled.

In the instant case, the

Compromise and Settlement Agreement signed by Mr. Wilburn
does not specifically address the issue of permanent and total
disability, nor does it purport to be a general release
settling all of the claims Mr. Wilburn might raise as a
result of the injuries he sustained on April 14, 1980, during
the course of his employment.

His claim for permanent total

disability benefits is not, therefore, barred.

8

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISALLOWANCE OF CLAIMS NOT EXPRESSLY
SETTLED BY AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES CONSTITUTES AN INVALID
WAIVER OF RIGHTS TO COMPENSATION UNDER UTAH LAW.
Utah Code Ann., §35-1-90 (1953 as amended)
prohibits agreements by employees waiving their rights to
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

That

section reads in part, as follows:
No agreement by an employee to waive his
rights to compensation under thi$ title
shall be valid . . .
In view of this clear statutory prohibition against waivers,
settlement agreements affecting a worker's right to
compensation must be carefully examined to ensure that no
waiver takes place.

Furthermore, such agreements must be

strictly construed so that only those claims expressly settled
by the parties are precluded from future pursuit.

In the

instant case, Mr. Wilburn seeks to assert a claim for
permanent and total disability as a result of injuries he
suffered while working for respondent Interstate Electric on
April 14, 1980. Respondents allege that Mr. Wilburn's claim
is barred by a Compromise and Settlement Agreement which was
executed by him and the respondents and which was approved by
the Commission on November 28, 1984.

(A copy of the Compromise

and Settlement Agreement is attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit
"A.")

However, a review of the Agreement executed by the

parties undermines respondent's position.
9

Nowhere is the issue

of permanent and total disability or the intended effect of the
Agreement on such a claim discussed.

Furthermore, there is no

language in the Agreement suggesting that the alleged
settlement achieved therein was intended to be a full and final
settlement of all of Mr. Wilburn's claims arising out of the
injuries he sustained on April 14, 1980.
On page 2 of the Agreement, the first full paragraph,
it states:
WHEREAS, the Applicant now claims that he
is entitled to additional benefits but the
Employer and the Fund dispute said claim
and also deny liability for any benefits
which have been paid or are yet claimed by
Applicant under the Utah Workmen's
Compensation Act, . . .
The type of claim and additional benefits sought by Mr.
Wilburn as referred to in the above-cited paragraph are
never specifically identified in the Agreement.

The Agreement

does provide for the payment of additional temporary total
disability and additional permanent partial disability benefits
to the cipplicant, but it does not say that the payment of those
benefits is in lieu of Mr. Wilburn's assertion of a claim for
permanent and total disability.
Since the waiver of any rights to which an employee
is otheirwise entitled is contrary to law, it stands to reason
that where rights are not specifically addressed by an alleged
settlement agreement, they cannot legitimately be said to have
been compromised and settled.

This conclusion is supported by

the Decision in Cretella v. New York Dock Co., 289 N.Y.
254, 45 N.E.2d 429 (1942.)

In Cretella, the applicant

10

sought an award for permanent total disability benefits several
years after receiving a "lump sum settlement" in 1934. New
York law provided for the commutation of periodical benefits
owed to a worker to one or more lump payments, (a "lump sum
settlement") so long as certain factors were taken into
consideration.

The 1934 award did not follow the directions of

the statute in computing the lump sum awarded to the applicant,
however, and the Court of Appeals therefore concluded that the
settlement was actually an attempt to compromise the injured
employee's claim.

The New York Workman's Compensation Act,

like the Utah Act, contained a statute prohibiting waivers.

In

view of this provision, the Court held:
True it is that our Compensation Law does
not prohibit 'settlements' but, in view of
the obvious and well-known policy and
intent of the whole statute and in view of
Sections 32 and 33, which forbid any waiver
by a claimant of his right to compensation
or any release by him of benefits due, such
an express prohibition of 'settlement' was
probably thought by the drafters to be
unnecessary. We hold that there can be no
valid compromise of the amounts due a
claimant under this law. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 430. The court further noted that before the
applicant had received the 1934 lump sum settlement, the
Industrial Board had approved a number of other awards to him
in 1928 and 1929 for partial, temporary disability, thus
implying a finding of temporary partial disability.

The Board

had also approved one prior lump sum settlement in 1930,
without making a specific finding as to the extent or probable
duration of the applicant's disability.
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It then stated:

Since neither
of these attempted
'settlements1 involves any classification
of claimant's disability, the only
classifications discoverable here are those
of partial, temporary disability implicit
in the 1928 and 1929 awards above referred
to. Those 1928-29 classifications were
•erroneous and not in the interest of
justice' since the Board has now found on
sufficient proof that claimant is
permanently totally disabled as a result of
the 1928 accident. In a situation like
this, Section 15, subdivision 6-a, of the
Workman's Compensation Law permits
reclassification 'at any time, without
regard to the date of accident.'
Id. at 431.
The instant case is like Cretella in that the
alleged settlement agreement does not refer to any
classification of Mr. Wilburn's disability.

Additionally,

the only payments made under the Agreement are for temporary
total and permanent partial disability, thus implying a finding
of only permanent partial impairment on the part of Mr.
Wilburn.

Since Mr. Wilburn has presented sufficient

evidence to show that his disability is, in fact, permanent and
total, the Agreement cannot stand as a bar to his current
claim.
The same conclusion reached in Cretella has also
been reached in more recent decisions.

For example, in

Wacome v. Paul Mushero Const. Co., 498 A.2d 593 (Me.
1985), the plaintiff suffered an industrial injury to his left
foot and lower back.

Following the accident, the plaintiff and

his employer entered into a compensation agreement which
contained a description of the injury to his foot but did not
contain a description of the injury to his back.
12

Approximately

two years later, the employee sought additional recovery for
his back injury which, at that time, had become disabling.

The

employer defended stating that the compensation agreement
barred any further recovery for injuries arising out of the
industrial accident in question.

The Supreme Judicial Court of

Maine reversed the decision of the Commission denying
additional benefits to the employee and stated:
Only the employee's foot injuries were
described in the approved settlement. The
compensation paid was for the described
foot injuries. The agreement dofes not
purport to cover any injury to the
employee's back, and no agreement exists
between the parties concerning those
injuries. The employee retains the legal
right to seek compensation for the injury
to his back.
Id. at 594.
The same conclusion was reached by the Supreme Court
of Minnesota in the case of Hanson v. Jer Her Builders, 366
N.W.2d 294 (Minn. 1985).

Therein, the plaintiff negotiated a

settlement for an injury "in the nature of an injury to the
eyes" for which he received compensation for "permanent partial
disability of 13% of the visual field or tlfie body as a whole."
Six weeks after signing the settlement agreement, the employee
filed a second petition seeking additional benefits for a 15%
permanent partial disability of the head.

The employer denied

liability on the grounds that the prior settlement had been a
compromise of all permanent partial disability arising out of
the accident leading to the plaintiff's injuries.

The Supreme

Court of Minnesota held that although the stipulated settlement
was somewhat ambiguous, it contained no specific reference to
13

any permanent partial disability of the head.

Therefore, the

employee's claim for permanent partial disability to the head
was not foreclosed.

Id. at 298. Although the decisions in

Wacome and Hanson deal specifically with claims for
particular injuries allegedly settled via a compromise
agreement, their holdings are equally applicable to the case at
bar where the matter at issue is the type of claim purportedly
settled.
The conclusion reached by our own Utah Supreme Court
in Barber Asphalt Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n., 135 P.2d 266
(Utah 1943) also supports Mr. Wilburn's contention that only
claims expressly compromised may be deemed barred from
subsequent assertion.

In Barber, the applicant suffered a

compensable industrial injury.

The medical panel gave him a 5%

permanent partial disability rating which he disputed.

He

applied for a hearing before the Commission, but before the
hearing was held, entered into a Settlement Agreement with his
employer on the basis of a 15% permanent partial disability
rating.

The Agreement signed by the applicant clearly stated

that it constituted a final settlement of all claims arising
out of the applicant's industrial accident.

Furthermore,

before signing the Agreement, the applicant was advised by his
own independent counsel.

The Commission subsequently approved

the Settlement Agreement and payment was made according to its
terms.

Approximately one year later, the applicant filed a

claim for additional compensation, alleging that his condition
had deteriorated to the point he was totally disabled.

14

After

reviewing the results of another medical examination, the
Commission came to the conclusion that the applicant was indeed
totally disabled and that he was thus entitled to benefits for
permanent and total disability.

The employer and its insured

disputed this finding and alleged that the settlement agreement
was a complete bar to the applicant's claim for permanent total
disability benefits.

In spite of a finding that all parties to

the action conceded that the agreement in Question was intended
at the time of its execution to be a final settlement of all of
the applicants claims, the Utah Supreme COurt upheld the
decision of the Commission awarding additional benefits.
doing, it stated:
We think a reasonable view of thk
provisions of the Utah Act and due
consideration of the objects and purposes
of such acts in general and the history
which prompted their enactment, requires us
to say that the Legislature intended to
prevent an agreement such as shown in this
case from becoming a bar to a cl^im for
additional compensation for an ihcrease in
disability.
Id. at 270.

It further elaborated as follows:

The workman, as shown by the present
evidence, is entitled to compensation as
for total permanent disability or surgical
treatment as required by the order appealed
from. At the time the agreement was
entered into, he had the right to claim
such compensation in case the developments
which have now taken place shoulfl occur.
The effect of the agreement is to release
the company from that liability. It was in
effect a waiver to claim a right which the
lawffayehim. The facts establishing
liability for results flowing from the
injury in this case were not in dispute.
It was not a compromise agreement as- to
facts to establish liability. It was an
agreement to accept payment for~"partial
15

In so

disability under a law which gave the
workman the right to compensation for total
disability if it should afterward result
from the injury. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 271.
Mr. Wilburn's situation is nearly identical to
Barber.

As previously stated, the Compromise and Settlement

Agreement between Mr. Wilburn and the respondents provides
only for the payment of temporary total and permanent partial
disability benefits.

It fails to address the issue of

permanent and total disability specifically and it does not
purport to be a full and final settlement of all of Mr.
Wilburn's claims. Also, since the execution of the Agreement
on November 28, 1984, Mr. Wilburn has experienced a
deterioration of his condition just like the applicant in
Barber.

This fact is confirmed by both the tentative finding

of permanent total disability by the Administrative Law Judge
in his Interim Order and the medical evidence on record.

For

example, on November 1, 1985, Mr. Wilburn was seen by Dr.
Gordon Affleck.

After Mr. Wilburn's visit, Dr. Affleck

noted:
Gilbert comes in again to discuss his
medical problems. He is certainly
progressing with his problems. He is
worse, it seems, each time that I see him
as far as range of motion and the number of
symptoms that he is having. . . .
(R. at 214.)

In a letter dated November 1, 1985, Dr. Affleck

noted that Mr. Wilburn's overall disability "[had] increased
considerably" since he first started seeing him.

He also

stated that he would rate Mr. Wilburn's permanent partial

16

impairment at that point in time to be 45% with 30% of that
disability rating attributable to his lumbar spine alone. Of
the 30%, he stated 18% was preexisting and 12% was due to the
industrial incident.
In Meecham v. Industrial Comm'n. of Utah, 692
1

P.2d 783 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court held that claims
for permanent and total disability are governed by Utah Code
Ann. §35-1-67 which contains no statute of limitations.
The Court also noted that under §35-1-78, the Industrial
Commission has continuing jurisdiction to inodify awards where
it feels modification is justified.

In the instant case, Mr.

Wilburn has experienced a continuing deterioration of his
condition since his industrial accident, tie is, therefore,
entitled to invoke the continuing jurisdiction of the
Commission and to assert a claim for permanent total
disability.

Because this is his right undfer the Act, any

attempt to interpret the Compromise and Settlement Agreement so
as to prevent him from exercising it must be struck down as an
invalid waiver.
POINT II
A COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED
ON THE BASIS OF DISPUTED LIABILITY MAY NOT BAR AN
EMPLOYEE'S SUBSEQUENT CLAIM WHERE THE COMPENSABILITY
OF THE EMPLOYEE'S CLAIM WAS NOT, IN FACT, DOUBTFUL.
The respondents seek to uphold the validity of the
Agreement by distinguishing the instant case from Barber.
It is their position that Barber is not controlling because
the compensability of Mr. Wilburn's claim was doubtful, and
17

thus subject to compromise.

However, in this case, it is clear

that compensability was not, in fact, a doubtful issue upon
which reasonable minds could legitimately differ.

Thus, the

respondent's raising of the "no accident" defense was not done
in good faith and the mere assertion that there was a "serious
and disputed question as to whether or not the Employer [was]
liable to the Applicant for any benefits under the Utah
Workman's Compensation Act," will not render the Agreement a
valid settlement of Mr. Wilburn's rights under the
Compensation Act.
The only apparent basis relied upon by the
respondents in asserting the defense of no accident was the
information provided by Mr. Wilburn to the insurance
adjuster, Libby Lowther, in a recorded statement taken
May 22, 1980, more than a month after the accident happened.
Although the Statement is not in evidence, appellant would like
to point out that he had the opportunity to review the
transcription of the statement taken by Ms. Lowther.

The

transcription was fraught with places where his responses to
the questions posed by Ms. Lowther were inaudible to the
typist transcribing it. Many of the inaudibles appeared at
points in the statement where Mr. Wilburn and Ms. Lowther
were discussing how the accident happened and the onset of Mr.
Wilburn's pain.

Although Mr. Wilburn at one point stated

that he first experienced pain a few minutes after lifting the
power plant, he also stated in the same Statement that he
experienced immediate pain and his testimony at the hearing
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regarding this point was that he experienced pain immediately
after lifting the power plant but that it became much more
severe five to ten minutes later.

(R. at £l.)

It is

uncontested that Mr. Wilburn lifted a power plant weighing
between 70 and 90 pounds just prior to, if not simultaneous
with, the onset of his pain.

There is no Evidence of any

non-work related activity engaged in by Mr. Wilburn between
the lifting incident and the onset of his pain, which, even in
the light most favorable to the respondents, set in no more
than ten minutes after he lifted the generator.

A delay of

five to ten minutes between the lifting of an object weighing
at least 70 pounds and the onset of suddeni severe pain is not a
sufficient time lag to create a bona fide dispute as to the
causal connection between the injury and Mr. Wilburn's
employment activities.

Of particular significance on this

point is the fact that in both his Interim Order and his
Supplemental Order, the Administrative Law Judge stated that in
his opinion, "there was no doubt as to the compensability of
the applicant's claim."

(R. at 373.)

It is also significant to note that prior to raising
the no accident defense, respondents paid Mr. Wilburn
temporary total and permanent partial disability benefits in
the amount of $39,234.00, over a period of approximately three
years.

In addition to the aforementioned compensation, the

respondents also paid all of Mr. Wilburn's ongoing medical
expenses.

If the respondents felt they truly had a legitimate

defense to Mr. Wilburn's lifting accident after obtaining his
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statement, it seems they would have asserted this defense at
that point in time rather than continue to pay Mr. Wilburn
over such an extended period.

In view of all of the

above-stated facts, it is highly questionable that the
respondent's decision to raise the no accident defense was, in
fact, based on a bona fide dispute as to compensability.
POINT III
IN VIEW OF THE EXPRESS STATUTORY PROHIBITION AGAINST
WAIVERS, ALL AMBIGUITIES IN AN ALLEGED SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT AND ALL REASONABLE DOUBTS AS TO THE
INTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES MUST BE RESOLVED
IN FAVOR OF THE WORKER
In the instant case, Mr. Wilburn testified that at
the time he signed the Compromise and Settlement Agreement,
it was his understanding that the only claims he was
compromising were his then-current claims for additional
temporary total and permanent partial disability benefits. Mr.
Wilburn's benefits were terminated by National Union on
September 30, 1983, and he had had great difficulty in getting
them reinstated even though he had been told by Gordon Wyatt,
the adjuster handling his claim, that if he would furnish him
with some additional medical information regarding his current
condition, those benefits would be paid once again.
76.)

(R. at

Prior to the time his temporary total disability benefits

were terminated, Dr. Hess had written to Mr. Wyatt on
June 20, 1983, giving Mr. Wilburn a higher disability rating
than the rating he had assigned to him after his examination in
February of 1981. Mr. Wilburn stated, however, that even
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with the increased disability rating given him by respondent's
own physician, no additional award had been offered to him.
(R. at 76.)
Following Mr. Wyatt's request for additional
medical information, Mr. Wilburn contacted Dr. Affleck who
also wrote directly to Mr. Wyatt.

In a lfetter dated

November 22, 1983, Dr. Affleck stated:
I think Mr. Wilburn will be willing to
accept a compromise position, perhaps
receiving a cutoff date of temporary total
disability as of the date of this letter,
and then making a settlement as to the
permanent partial rating of approximately
36% as previously noted on correspondence
from Dr. Wally Hess.
(R. at 245.)

After receiving Dr. Affleck's letter, Mr.

Wyatt arranged for Mr. Wilburn to see Dr. )David Egli for
a psychiatric evaluation.

It was following Dr. Egli's

evaluation that Mr. Wilburn was instructed to meet with Mr.
Poelman for the purpose of further discussing his case.
After his meeting with Mr. Poelman, Mr. Poelman prepared
the Agreement in question.

It is significant to note that the

Agreement appears to follow the suggested compromise of
benefits suggested by Dr. Affleck in his letter.
Furthermore, when questioned specifically about his
understanding of the Agreement and the effect it would have on
his future benefits, Mr. Wilburn stated:
A.

Well, it reads real clearly here to
me, in this page 3. On paragraph 3.
It says: 'The Employer and the Fund
agree that the Fund will reimburse the
Employer for two-thirds of all future
medical expense and temporary total
disability for which liability to the
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Applicant may be incurred.•
(Emphasis added.)
Q.

What was your understanding of the
language?

A.

Well, I thought at a future time I
could go back for maybe more total
disability, or whatever was really
coming to me, even a permanent. I
thought I should have had a permanent
total disability by then, without
going through this.

(R. at 78.)
Thus, it is clear from the facts and circumstances
cited above that because he had had an increase in his
disability ratings, and because he had provided the respondents
with the additional medical information they had requested
showing a further deterioration of his condition, Mr. Wilburn
felt he was entitled to receive additional benefits.
Furthermore, it is apparent that Mr. Wilburn was led to
believe by the very language of the Agreement itself that the
respondents were contemplating incurring additional liability
on his behalf.
Although the respondents contend that the intention
of the parties was to compromise and settle all of Mr.
Wilburn's claims, the express language of the agreement does
not support this position.

Counsel for respondents Interstate

Electric and National Union drafted the Compromise and
Settlement Agreement.

If the agreement was,in fact, intended

to be a full and final compromise of all of Mr. Wilburnfs
claims, it should have been drafted so as to clearly reflect
this fact.

In the case of Compromise and Settlement Agreements
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affected in the area of workmen's compensation, where there is
uncertainty as to the intentions of the parties, all reasonable
doubts should be resolved in favor of the employee.

This

conclusion was reached by the Court of Appeals in New Mexico in
the case of Ruiz v. City of Albuquerque, 91 N.M. 526, 577
P.2d 424 (1978).

In Ruiz, the court was faced with a

situation similar to the one at bar.

The applicant had

suffered an industrial injury which he later settled.

Pursuant

to the settlement, he signed a stipulation providing that upon
the filing of a Satisfaction of Judgment, all of the claims he
had against the defendant as described in his Complaint would
be "fully and finally released, discharged and satisfied."

The

judgment on the release released "any and all claims by the
plaintiff."

When the applicant later sought to hold the

employer liable for the payment of vocational rehabilitation
benefits under the State Workmen's Compensation Act, the court
found that there was a discrepancy between the judgment and the
stipulation inasmuch as the stipulation released only the
applicant's claims for injuries described in the Complaint.

It

further found that the only claims made by the plaintiff in the
Complaint were for compensation for disability and medical
expenses.

It then stated, quoting from Djjnkle v. Denton,

68 N.M. 108, 112, 359 P.2d 345, 347 (1961), as follows:
* * *

The primary rule of construction of
releases is that the intention of the
parties must govern " ~. ~. This intention
must be gathered from the words used in the
instrument and not from matters dehors the
writing. In accordance with th^se
23

principles, it has been held that words in
a release should not be construed to extend
beyond the express consideration mentioned,
and that such words should not be construed
to operate as a release of indebtedness
which the parties apparently did not
intend
* * *

(Emphasis in original.)
Id. at 427. The court then went on to state:
New Mexico looks with disfavor on releases
that smother a meritorious claim for
relief. In personal injury cases, this
policy was expressly adopted by the
enactment of the "Release Act.• (Citations
omitted.) Under the Compensation Act, to
fulfill its purposes, we believe that any
reasonable doubt as to the intentions of
the parties and the effect of a release""
should be construed in favor of the
workman. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 428. The Court reversed the decision of the lower
court and awarded rehabilitation benefits to the plaintiff.
In the instant case, there is, at the very least,
reasonable doubt as to what the parties actually sought to
accomplish by execution of the Agreement.

The rule of

construction employed by the New Mexico court should,
therefore, be employed by this Court to render the Agreement
invalid insofar as it purports to bar Mr. Wilburn's claim for
permanent and total disability.

This position is further

supported by the fact that at the time he executed the
Agreement, Mr. Wilburn was not represented by independent
counsel.

Furthermore, he was not the drafting party and the

Agreement itself not only fails to state on its face that is a
compromise of such a claim but it also contains ambiguous
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language which could reasonably be interpreted by a layman as a
reservation of his rights to pursue a claii^i in the future if he
experienced a further change in conditions*

All of these

factors favor a finding that the Compromise and Settlement
Agreement signed by Mr. Wilburn does not effectively bar his
present claim.
CONCLUSION

Because agreements by an employed waving his/her
rights to compensation under the Utah Workmen's Compensation
Act are void by statute, any Compromise and Settlement
Agreement signed by an employee must be strictly construed so
as to avoid a waiver.

Where the Agreement in question does not

expressly purport to foreclose the assertion of all future
claims of the workman, foreclosure of such claims should not be
implied.

Furthermore, all reasonable doubts regarding the

intentions of the parties should be resolved in favor of the
workman in order to effect the beneficent purposes of the
Worker's Compensation Act.

In the instant case, Mr. Wilburn

signed an Agreement paying him additional temporary total
disability and permanent partial disability benefits only.

The

Agreement contains language suggesting the anticipation of
future liability by the respondents.

It does not mention in

any manner the issue of permanent total disability nor does it
purport to be a full and final settlement bf any and all claims
that Mr. Wilburn might raise in connection with his
industrial injury.

In view of these facts and in view of the
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purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the Compromise and
Settlement Agreement herein should not be construed as a bar to
Mr. Wilburn's current claim for permanent and total
disability.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this J^Tg:

day o f

1987.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

2L E. DYER
STEPHANIE A. MALLORY
Attorneys for Appellant
Gilbert R. Wilburn
WILBURN3/SMW
sm03127
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was maiJ/ed, first class, postage prepaid
on this j£v7/^

day of /ft/Vc^^tf

, 1987, to the following

counsel of record:

Stuart L. Poelman
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Respondents
Interstate Electric an<pi
National Union Fire Ink. Co.
10 Exchange Place, 11th £loor
Salt Lake City, Utah 841X0
Erie V. Boorman
SECOND INJURY FUND
Attorney for Respondent
Second Injury Fund
P.O. Box 45580
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

WILBURN3/SMW
sm03137
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSiqN OF UTAH; -• j j ; • j"; ;-#«
• •

••

Case No. 81000909
GILBERT WILBURN,
Applicant-Employee,
VS.
INTERSTATE ELECTRIC, NATIONAL
UNION FIRE INSURANCE and
SECOND INJURY FUND,

COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT

Employee-Carrier.

THIS AGREEMENT entered into this date by and between
Gilbert R. Wilburn (hereinafter called "Applicant"), Interstate Electric and National Union Fire Insurance (hereinafter
collectively called "Employer"), and The ^econd Injury Fund
(hereinafter collectively called "The Fund"),
WHEREAS, Applicant claims to have sustained an injury by
accident arising out of or in the course of his employment
with Interstate Electric on April 14, 1980, and
WHEREAS, the parties hereto have previously entered into
a compensation agreement pursuant to which certain workmen's
compensation benefits have been paid to the applicant and
pursuant to which an order for reimbursement has been entered

by the Commission whereby The Fund has been ordered to reimburse the Employer for 75% of all medical expenses!a*rjdj tiein- I I I * I
• •

• • • • ••••

porary total disability benefits paid, and
WHEREAS, the Applicant now claims that he is entitled to
additional benefits but the Employer and The Fund dispute
said claim and also deny liability for any benefits which
have been paid or are yet claimed by Applicant under the Utah
Workmen's Compensation Act, and
WHEREAS, the Employer has paid to or on behalf of Applicant temporary total disability benefits and medical benefits
in the total sum of $41,054,66 for which the Fund has not yet
reimbursed the Employer for its pro rata share, and
WHEREAS, the parties acknowledge that there exists a
serious and disputed question as to whether or not the
Employer is liable to the Applicant for any benefits under
the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act, and
WHEREAS, it is the intent and desire of the Applicant,
the Employer and The Fund that the said claim of the Applicant be compromised and settled so as to avoid the necessity
of further litigation, and
WHEREAS, the parties to this agreement have carefully
considered their respective positions with respect to said
claims and have concluded that the settlement of claims
herein made is fair and equitable in every respect.
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NOW, THEREFORE, in reliance of the fotegoing recitals and
• •

• •^

•^

• •

•

in consideration of the following terms ahd obligations^ the • • • • * •
• •

• • • •

• • • •

parties agree:
1.

Employer shall pay to Applicant ^he additional sum

of $1,590.00 representing additional temporary total disability plus the sum of $2,184.00 representing an additional
5% permanent partial disability over and ibove those amounts
which it has already paid to Applicant.
2.

The Fund shall pay to Applicant the sum of $2,184.00

representing an additional 5% permanent partial disability
over and above those amount which The Fund has already paid
to Applicant.
3.

The Fund shall reimburse the Employer for two-thirds

of all temporary total disability and medical benefits heretofore and now paid by the Employer for which the Employer
has not yet received any reimbursement from The Fund, which
two-thirds reimbursement is calculated to be in the total sum
of $28,429.77.

The Employer and The Fund agree that The Fund

will reimburse the Employer for two-thirds of all future
medical expense and temporary total disability for which
liability to the Applicant may be incurred.
4.

It is understood and agreed by a^id between the par-

ties that this Agreement constitutes a compromise of a disputed claim and does not constitute an admission of any fact,
contention or liability on the part of any of the parties.
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5.
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This Agreement shall become binding and effective

only when approved by the Industrial Commission olfliMrah* I * I I T.#i
•

«

• •

DATED this

day of

•

«

•

•

• • • •

•

, 1984.
APPLICANT:

Gilbert R. Wilburn
INTERSTATE ELECTRIC and NATIONAL
UNION FIRE INSURANCE:

THE SECOND INJURY FUNJ

Approved by the Industrial Commission of Utah:

W//A WM.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
JK

I certify

that

on

November 28
, 19 84
COMPROMISE AND (SETTLEMENT
attached
AGREEMENT

a copy of

the

was m a i l e d

to

addresses,

postage

the

following

persons

at

the

following

paid:

Slhulra Southern
UnigaiM^nsurattce Group
4444 Sdutfr ZOO East
J ^ ± L a k e City>4Jtali>«410l7
Gilbert A, Martinez
Administrator
Second Injury Fund
Stuart L. Poelman, Esquir^
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
Attorneys at Law
i
10 Exchange Place - Eleventh Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 l|o
Gilbert R. Wilburn
1920 South 50 West
Bountiful, Utah 84010
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By

Diana M. Hocking

